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On March 6, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided the case of Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington. 1 In doing so, it
became the first federal circuit court of appeals to decide a "right-to-die" case and
to find that such a "right" was protected by the United States Constitution. Soon
thereafter, on April 2, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided the case of Quill v. Vacco. The court in that case also found that
physician-assisted suicide by terminally ill patients was protected by the
Constitution.2 Parties in both cases announced their intention to seek review of
these federal court decision by the United States Supreme Court. This article will
provide a brief exposition and analysis of the issues considered in both cases.
Compassion in Dying v. State

Compassion in Dying v. State involved a challenge to the Washington State law
which makes assisting suicide a crime punishable. by imprisonment of up to five
years and a fine of up to $10,000. The law states that "a person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowlingly causes or aids another person to
attempt suicide."3 The circuit court concluded "that there is a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's own death"
(p. 1). Moreover, the court ruled that insofar as a state law "prohibits physicians
from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally ill, competent
adults who wish to hasten their own deaths" such a statute violates the United
States Constitution and is therefore invalid (p.. 1). Should the circuit court
decision stand it will have extraordinary influence within the United States. Since
the Ninth Circuit includes the states of California, Washington, Oregon, Arizona,
Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, and Hawaii its ruling will affect approximately
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a quarter of the population of the United States. On March 25, the Attorney
General for the State of Washington announced her intention to appeal the
court's decision to the United States Supreme Court.
The challenge to the Washington law was brought by eight plaintiffs: four
physicians who treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients and a
non-profit organization called Compassion in Dying. The three terminally ill
patients involved in the case are 'Jane", "John", and "James". "Jane" is a
69-year-old retired physician who has suffered since 1988 from cancer which has
now metastasized throughout her skeleton. "Jane" is completely bedridden and
the only medical treatment available to her is medication which cannot fully
alleviate her pain. "John" is a 44-year-old artist dying of AIDS. The court noted
that "John" is "especially cognizant" of the suffering imposed by a lingering
terminal illness because he was the primary caregiver for his long-time
companion who died of AIDS in 1991. "James" is a 69-year-old retired sales
representative who suffers from emphysema which causes him a constant
sensation of suffocating and heart failure related to his pulmonary disease. In
addition to the plaintiffs, various organizations also filed briefs in support of the
challenge to the law including Americans for Death with Dignity, American
Civil Liberties Union, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, AIDS
Action Council, and American Humanist Association. Organizations that filed
briefs in defense of the law included United States Catholic Conference, Catholic
Health Association, Americans United for Life, and Washington State Hospital
Association.
In beginning its analysis, the court observed: "In examining whether a liberty
interest exists in determining the time and manner of one's death, we begin with
the compelling similarities between right-to-die cases and abortion cases. In the
former as in the latter, the relative strength of the competing interests changes as
physical, medical, or related circumstances vary. In right-to-die cases the
outcome of the balancing test may differ at different points along the life cycle as a
person's physical or medical condition deteriorates, just as in abortion cases the
permissibility of restrictive state legislation may vary with the progression of the
pregnancy. Equally important, both types of cases raise issues of life and death,
and both arouse similar religious and moral concerns. Both also present basic
questions about an individual's right of choice" (p. 7). After noting the similarities
between the "right-to-die" and abortion, the court stated that "in deciding
right-to-die cases, we are guided by the [U.S. Supreme] Court's approach to the
abortion cases" (p. 8) and in particular, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in its
most recent abortion case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 4
However, before the circuit court began its analysis of the "right-to-die" in
light of the abortion jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it first defended its
formulation of the legal issue to be resolved. The circuit court stated, "While
some people refer to the liberty interest implicated in right-to-die cases as a liberty
interest in committing suicide, we do not describe it that way. We use the broader
and more accurate terms, 'the right to die,' 'determining the time and manner of
one's death,' and 'hastening one's death' for an important reason. The liberty
interest we examine encompasses a whole range of acts that are generally not
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considered to constitute 'suicide.' Included within the liberty interest we examine,
is for example, the act of refusing or terminating unwanted medical treatment"
(p. 9). Indeed, the level of generality chosen by the court in defining the question
to be addressed was not simply important in resolving the issue of whether the
"right-to-die" is a liberty interest protected by the Constitution, but was actually
outcome determinative of the question. As one commentator on American
constitutional law has written, "Insofar as the right of personhood is limited to
liberties long revered as fundamental in our society, it makes all the difference in
the world what level of generality one employs to test the pedigree of an asserted
liberty claim."5 In other words, this commentator continued, "It is crucial, in
asking whether an alleged right forms part of a traditional liberty, to define the
liberty at a high enough level of generality to permit unconventional variants to
claim protection along with mainstream versions of protected conduct."6
The recurring issue confronting the United States Supreme Court and all lower
federal courts is what standard to apply in determining whether a particular
activity is protected within the scope of the liberty specified by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 7 In attempting to ascertain
whether an activity should be classified as a "fundamental liberty" and therefore
protected from state prohibition or infringement, the Supreme Court has stated
that the interest to be protected must be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if[such liberties] were sacrificed"
and "where they are characterized as those liberties that are deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."8 Like the "right to abortion", the "right to die" is
nowhere to be found in the United States Constitution. To the contrary, for most
of the constitutional history of the United States, states not only refused to
recognize such activity as a "right", but the state governments imposed criminal
penalties on those involved in such activity. Thus, if the conduct is narrowly
defined, that is, defined so as to limit the description of the so-called "liberty"
interest to the conduct at issue and to no other more generally accepted conduct,
then it is very difficult to regard the conduct as a "liberty" since it traditionally has
been criminalized by the state.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court rejected such a close
historical context for the definition of the liberty interest at issue. The Supreme
Court stated, "It is ... tempting ... to suppose that the [Constitution] protects only
those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against
government interference by other rules oflaw when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified ... But such a view would be inconsistent with our la w. It is a promise
of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
may not enter."9 The circuit court quoted this language with approval in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington and went on to observe that had the
Supreme Court not taken such a broad view of what constitutes liberty, "it would
not have held that women have a right to have an abortion [since] as the dissent
pointed out in Roe v. Wade, more than three-quarters of the existing states (at
least 28 out of 37 states); as well as eight territorial legislatures restricted or
prohibited abortions in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted" (p.
13).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence was found to be
persuasive in another important aspect. The Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood Y. Casey re-affirmed the constitutional right to abortion. It did so by
replacing the notion of "privacy" as the constitutional principle which
encompassed a "right" to abortion with a broad, seemingly open-ended concept
of liberty. After reviewing its decisions related to marriage, contraception,
abortion, family relationships and child rearing, the Supreme Court stated,
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."JO
The circuit court found this analysis broad enough to extend beyond the issue
of abortion and include the "right to die." According to the circuit court, "the
decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and
autonomy.' A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure
of his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane death
rather than being reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of
helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent. How a person dies not only
determines the nature of the final period of his existence, but in many cases, the
enduring memories held by those who love him" (p. 19).
In holding that a "right to die" is protected by the Constitution, the circuit
court also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cruzan Y.
Director, Missouri Department of Health. JJ In Cruzan, the parents of a young
woman in a persistent vegetative state sought a court order entitling them to
terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures the hospital was
providing to their daughter. The Supreme Court observed that while "a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment," 12 and that therefore "the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition"13 the question was not automatically
resolved in favor of the parents' request. The Supreme Court noted that "an
incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to
exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 'right'
must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate."14 The State of
Missouri had recognized in its law that a surrogate may act on behalf of a patient
to refuse or terminate life-prolonging hydration and nutrition, but the state had
required that the surrogate's action must conform to the wishes of the patient. In
addition, the law required that the surrogate show by "clear and convincing"
evidence that such was the wish of the patient. Thus, in Cruzan the Supreme
Court limited its ruling to the question of whether such a procedural requirement
of the state was an infringement upon the patient's constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving treatment. The Court held that such a high evidentiary
standard did not violate the Constitution.
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Although in Cruzan the Supreme Court ruled only on the narrow issue of
whether the state's evidentiary standard to ascertain the patients' desire to
terminate treatment was unconstitutionally strict, the: dissenting and concurring
opinions of justices raised issues that would resurfaoe in Compassion in Dying.
Dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun (all strongly supportive of
the constitutional right to abortion announced by the Supreme Court in the case
of Roe v. Wade) argued that Missouri's evidentiary standard was
unconstitutional because it amounted to an "obsllacle to the exercise of a
fundamental right."IS They maintained that "the only state interest asserted here
is a general interest in the preservation of life. But the State has no legitimate
general interest in someone's life, completely abstracted from the interest of the
person living that life, that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical
treatment. The regulation of constitutionally prote<:ted decisions . .. must be
predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the choice
the individual has made ... Thus, the State's general interest in life must accede to
Nancy Cruzan's particularized and intense interest in self-determination in her
choice of medical treatment. There is simply nothing legitimately within the
State's purview to be gained by superseding her decision."16
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia directly disputed the contention of the
dissenting justices that "the state has no legitimate general interest in someone's
life . .. that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment."
Justice Scalia insisted that while the dissenter's proposition sounded "moderate
enough" it could not be "logically" limited to only the circumstances of the
Cruzan case. He argued that if one agrees with the dissenter's view that the
general interest ofthe State in protecting life must always yield to the individual's
particularized and intense interest in self-determination to refuse medical
treatment, then "he must also believe that the Stae must accede to her
particularized and intense interest in self-determiniation in her choice whether to
continue living or to die . .. It seems to me, "Justice Scalia continued, that the
dissenters' position "ultimately rests upon the proposition that it is none of the
State's business if a person wants to commit suicide ... But it is not a view
imposed by our constitutional traditions, in which the power of the State to
prohibit suicide is unquestionable."I?
In Compassion in Dying, the circuit court held that "the principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected. liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment" articulated by the Supreme Court in Cruzan
should be applied to the question of physician-assisted suicide (p. 19). With
virtually no analysis, the circuit court simply announced that "we conclude that
Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of artificial
provisio.n of life~sustaining food and water, necessarily recognizes a liberty
mterest m hastemng one's own death" (p. 20). The circuit court, however, failed
to explain why this should be so. Nor did the court explain why it is that the
common law prohibition of suicide existed alongside that of the common law
right to be free of medical treatment without consent. Both principles reach back
beyond the American constitutional tradition to the English common law.
After having asserted a constitutionally protected "liberty interest in hastening
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one's own death," the circuit court then considered six interests of the state to
determine whether one or more of those interests outweighed the individual's
liberty interest. As defined by the circuit court these interests were: "( 1) the state's
general interest in preserving life; (2) the state's more specific interest in preventing
suicide; (3) the state's interest in avoiding the involvement of third parties and in
precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) the state's interest in
protecting family members and loved ones; (5) the state's interest in protecting the
integrity of the medical profession; and (6) the state's interest in avoiding adverse
consequences that might ensue if the statutory provision at issue is declared
unconstitutional." The circuit court concluded that in no instance did the state
interest or any combination of state interests outweigh the individual's "liberty
interest in hastening one's own death".
The original three-judge panel which heard the appeal from the federal district
court decision had upheld the Washington law. Judge Noonan, author of the
original circuit court opinion, found all of the above state interests to be substantial
and sufficient to sustain the Washington State law. In particular, Judge Noonan
found persuasive the Supreme Court's determination in Cruzan that "there can be
no gainsaying" a state's interest "in the protection and preservation of human
life".18 Significantly for Judge Noonan, the Supreme Court cited in support of its
determination that "the majority of States in this country have laws imposing
criminal penalties on one who assists another in criminal suicide."19 Another
important state interest enumerated by Judge Noonan was the interest in
protecting the poor, racial minorities, the handicapped and the elderly from
exploitation and pressure. In reaching this conclusion Judge Noonan agreed with
the conclusions of the New York State Task Force on Life and Law report, When
Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context. The
Task Force appointed by the Governor of New York in 1984 unanimously
recommended that New York laws prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia
should not be changed. It concluded that "No matter how carefully any guidelines
are framed, assisted suicide and euthanasia will be practiced through the prism of
social inequality and bias that characterizes the delivery of services . . . The
practices will pose the greatest risks to those who are poor, elderly, members of a
minority groUp."20
Perhaps most importantly, the Task Force identified four major factors
contributing to the clinical background of the medical context regarding
physician-assisted suicide. First, the Task force found that "Contrary to what
many believe, the vast majority of individuals who are terminally ill or facing
severe pain or disability are not suicidal. Moreover, terminally ill patients who do
desire suicide or euthanasia often suffer from a treatable mental disorder, most
commonly depression. When these patients receive appropriate treatment for
depression, they usually abandon the wish to commit suicide." Second, the Task
Force concluded that "Uncontrolled pain, particularly when accompanied by
feelings of hopelessness and untreated depression, is a significant contributing
factor for suicide ... Medications and pain relief techniques now make it possible
to treat pain effectively for most patients." Third, the Task force determined that
"Despite the fact that effective treatments are available, severely and terminally
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ill patients generally do not receive adequate relief from pain." And fourth, the
Task Force stated the "Numerous barriers contribute to the pervasive inadequacy
of pain relief and palliative care in current clinical practice, including a lack of
professional knowledge and training, unjustified fears about physical and
psychological dependence, poor pain assessment, pharmacy practices, and the
reluctance of patients and their families to seek pain relief."21 In regard to the
fourth finding the Task Force noted that "The provision of pain medication is
legally acceptable even if it may hasten the patient's death, if the medication is
intended to alleviate pain (pain) not to cause death."22
However, the Ninth Circuit Court rejected such concerns and instead
concluded that "even though the protection of life is one of the state's most
important functions, the state's interest is dramatically diminished if the person it
seeks to protect is terminally ill ... and has expressed a wish that he be permitted
to die ... When patients are no longer able to pursue liberty or happiness and do
not wish to pursue life, the state's interest in forcing them to remain alive is clearly
less compelling" (p. 22). Moreover, the circuit dismissed the concern regarding
possible exploitation of historically disadvantaged groups such as the elderly,
handicapped and minorities, saying merely that "The argument that
disadvantaged persons will receive more medical services than the remainder of
the population in one, and only one, area - assisted ~uicide - is ludicrous on its
face" (p. 27).

Quill v. Vacco
Quill v Vacco involved a challenge to a New York State statute which provides
that a person is guilty of manslaughter when "he intentionally ... aids another
person to commit suicide."23 The Second Circuit Court ruled that state laws
which deny mentally competent patients who seek to end their lives during the
final stages of a terminal illness through the assistance of a physician deny such
patients the equal protection of the laws in violation of the United States
Constitution. Because the Second Circuit includes the states of New York,
Connecticut and Vermont, its decision also affects a significant number of
Americans. The New York law challenged by several physicians and by three
terminally ill patients: "Jane", a 76-year-old retired physical education instructor
who was dying of thyroid cancer; George Kingsley, a 48-year-old publishing
executive suffering from AIDS; and William Barth, a 28-year-old fashion editor
under treatment for AIDS. Friend of the Court briefs were also filed by many of
the organizations that filed similar briefs in Compassion in Dying v. State,
including United States Catholic Conference, American United for Life, Lamda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Association of People with AIDS,
Americans for Death with Dignity, and Hemlock S.ociety.
The Second Circuit Court specifically rejected the claim that physicianassisted suicide was a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In doing so, the Second Circuit Court's opinion
could be said to significantly undermine the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit's
decision. The Second Circuit Court observed that ' 'rights that have no textual
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support in the language of the Constitution but qualify for heightened judicial
protection include fundamental liberties so 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed'" (p. 9).
The court went on to conclude that "the right contended for here cannot be
considered so implicit in our understanding of ordered liberty that neither justice
nor liberty would exist if it were sacrificed. Nor can it be said that the right to
assisted suicide claimed by plaintiffs is deeply rooted in the nation's traditions and
history. Indeed, the very opposite is true. The Common Law of England, as
received by the American colonies, prohibited suicide and attempted suicide.
Although neither suicide nor attempted suicide is any longer a crime inthe United
States, 32 states, including New York, continue to make assisted suicide an
offense" (p. 10).
Moreover, the Second Circuit Court continued its different approach than that
of the Ninth Circuit by finding that New York's criminal prohibition of
physician-assisted suicide constituted a violation of the equal protection of the
law. The court stated that this guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment "simply
requires the states to treat in a similar manner all individuals who are similarly
situated" (p. 11). The court arrived at its conclusion invalidating the law through
a tenous process of generalization, refusing to consider distinctions in the medical
circumstance among various terminally-ill patients and instead considering all
terminally-ill patients who sought to "hasten" their death to be "similarly
situated". The court dismissed any significant difference under the law between
two types of decisions which the law had always recognized as profoundly
different; that is, the difference between the decision to refuse or withdraw certain
medical treatments and the decision to administer death-causing drugs with the
intention to thereby cause the death of the patient. In doing so, the court ignored
important distinctions that both medicine and law had traditionally recognized
and instead generalized that all such decisions would be considered under a single
category of decisions to "hasten death".
The court placed great emphasis in its analysis upon the fact that the New York
legislature in 1990 enacted a new law to allow a person to sign a "health care
proxy" to appoint an agent with "authority to make any and all health care
decisions" on the person's behalf including "those relating to the administration
of artificial nutrition and hydration."24 As a result of the passage of this statute,
the court ruled that "New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons
alike: those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems
are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems' but
those who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of lifesustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering
prescribed drugs" (p. 16-17). Thus, the court held that there is no legally relevant
distinction between assisted suicide and the withdrawal or withholding of lifesustaining medical treatment.
The court stated, "Indeed, there is nothing 'natural' about causing death by
means other than the original illness or its complications. The withdrawal of
hydration brings on death by debyration, and the withdrawal of ventilation
brings about respiration failure. By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial
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life-sustaining processes or refusing to accept them in the first place, a patient
hastens his death that by means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly
cannot be said that the death that immediately ensues is the natural result of the
progression of the disease or condition from which the patient suffers" (p. 17).
Whether or not it can be said that the death that ensues is the "natural" result of
the patient's medical condition, the medical condition is directly related to the
inability of the patient to perform the function "naturally" that is being provided
by artificial means. That is a circumstance of the patient which has always been
regarded as significant for both medical and legal purposes. Moreover, those who
justify the termination of such procedures from the standpoint of medical ethics
do so essentially on the basis that such procedures have become excessively
burdensome to the patient or have become futile. They are not justified on the
basis that they are necessary to hasten the death of the patient. Thus, the court was
only able to reach its conclusion by overturning distinctions which both medicine
and law have historically recognized as vital.
Moreover the court in Quill v. Vacca misconstrUte<i the nature of the liberty
interest involved in the right to refuse medical treatment by failing to appreciate
the relationship of such a right to the principle of bodily integrity ... Suicide
enjoys no such foundational support, however. When one acts to end one's life, it
is the intrusion of the lethal agent that violates bodily integrity."25 The New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law reached a similar conclusion when it found
that, "The imposition oflife-sustaining medical treatment against a patient's will
requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity and, in some cases, the use of
physical restraints, both of which are flatly inconsistent with society's basic
conception of personal dignity . . . It is this right against intrusion - not a general
right to control the timing and manner of death - that forms the basis of the
constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment."26
Finally, the circuit court dismissed the state's interest in protecting human life
in such circumstances. It stated that "the state's oontention has been that its
primary interest is in preserving the life of all its citizens at all times and under all
conditions. But what interest can the state posslibly have in requiring the
prolongation of a life that is all but ended? Surely, the:state's interest lessens as the
potential for life diminishes ... What concern prompts the state to interfere with a
mentally competent patient's 'right to define [his] own concept of existence, of
meaning, ofthe universe, and of the mystery of human life'" (p.17-18). While it
is true that the court's language addresses the circumstances of a mentally
competent patient suffering a terminal illness, it must also be recognized that the
court's premise, that "the state's interest lessens as the potential for life
diminishes", is surely one which cannot logically be limited to the situation of
termi.nal illness or to ~he me~tally competent patient. Certainly, the mentally
handicapped, the phYSically disabled and the elderly all experience in significant
ways a "diminishing" in their "potential" for life. Many of these citizens also
exper~ence a "dimi?ishing" ability to "define [their] own concept of existence, of
meaOlng, of the UOlverse, and ofthe mystery of human life." To recognize in the
law a concurrent "lessening" in the state's interest in protecting such life as the
court does, is a dangerous precedent.
'
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Conclusion
Although the circuit courts in both Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v.
Vacco asserted that the physician-assisted suicide of mentally competent, terminally
ill patients was protected by the United States Constitution, the fact that both courts
reached this conclusion through different and potentially contradictory rationales
highlights the tenuous link between suicide and the protections of American
constitutional law. The equal protection of the law rationale used in Quill v. Vacco
appears to rest almost entirely upon the circuit court's strained approach to the
realities of medical care at the end of life by ignoring the very real distinctions
between decisions to withdraw burdensome or futile procedures and affirmative
actions undertaken with the intention of killing the patient. One cannot expect that
such judicial reasoning can endure over time - constitutional law, like the practice
of medicine, is dependent upon specificity and the recognition of difference, not the
reverse.
The rationale of the circuit courts in both cases regarding the interest of the state
in protecting human life is considerably more troublesome from the standpoint of
constitutional law. Both courts seem to have accepted the contention of the
dissenting Supreme Court justices in Cruzan that the state's general interest in life
must accede to the patient's particularized interest. Such a view suggests that the
state's interest in protecting life is controlling only when unnecessary; that is, only
when there is no conflict between the interest of the state and the desire of the
individual. At other times, when there is a conflict, the individual interest in
choosing death must be recognized as paramount. Both courts also suggested that
the interest of the state in protecting life exists only according to some type of
sliding-scale: the state's interest in life is regulated by the patient's potential for life.
When the patient's potential for life dimishes so also must the state's interest in the
protection of that life diminish. For most of American constitutional history,
however, American society has viewed the right to life as "inalienable." One
difficulty presented by the courts' opinions in these cases is that if the right to life is
now held to be "alienable" by the individual who "possesses" the right, it is also
logically "alienable" by others and may one day be so in fact. Couple this dramatic
shift in the law with the corresponding weakening of the state's interest in preserving
life and American society may be set adrift on dangerous seas.
The United States Supreme Court may still avoid this difficulty by refusing to
extend the reach of constitutional protections to physician-assisted suicide. As
one commentator has observed, "A Court that refused to 'constitutionalize' a
'right to die' broad enough to uphold the claims of the Cruzan family is hardly
likely to 'constitutionalize' a right to assisted suicide."27 In that regard it is
significant that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cruzan specifically cited the
existence of state laws prohibiting assisted suicide as evidence of the state's
longstanding interest in the protection of human life. Moreover, all eight justices
were silent regarding any purported "right" to suicide within the factual
circumstances presented by the medical situation of Nancy Cruzan in the face of
Justice Scalia's assertion that "there is no significant support for the claim that a
right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental'
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or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'."
Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v. Vacco both entirely overlook two
important realities constitutive of the practice of medicine in the United States
today: one is psychological and the other is economic.
The first reality has been known for some time by physicians and can be
summarized as follows: "A request for hastened death may be a way of saying that
one does not feel worthy of great attention from the family ... The request for
euthanasia or assisted suicide may also be a means for patients to ask whether they
continue to be valued, and whether the burden of illness remains manageable and
the tasks of care meaningful. Helping patients to die quickly in such a situation does
not represent a recognition of their autonomy; it simply confirms their sense of
worthlessness and abandonment."28 To establish a new assisted right-to-die in this
context may only serve to further enhance this sense of diminished self-worth.
The second reality involves the economics of medicine at the end oflife. In the
United States the government-sponsored health program for the elderly, Medicare,
consistently experiences large expenditures for patients at the end of life. Studies
have shown that between 27 to 30 percent of payments for medical services under
the Medicare program are to the five to six percent of Medicare patients who die in
that year. For example, in 1988, the mean Medicare payment during the last year of
a patient's life was $13,316 as compared with $1 ,924 £Jr all other Medicare patients
- a ratio of nearly seven to one.29 Numerous studi,es have been undertaken to
estimate the amount of financial savings possible to both government and nongovernment health care programs from the greater use of health care proxies
(advance directives), hospice care and "less aggressive interventions". While such
estimates vary, one study using 1990 expenditures estimated that between $55
billion and $109 billion might be saved "from a policy of asking all patients about
their wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment and incorporating those wishes into
advanced directive."30 Others maintain that the cost savings to be achieved "by
reducing the use of aggressive life-sustaining intervention for dying patients" will be
much less, for example, only 3.3 percent of total national health care expenditures"
- a percentage estimated to save $29.7 billion in 1993.31
The present economic context for the delivery of health care services in the
United States is one in which government increasingly demands substantial costsavings in government-financed health care services. At the same time, an
increasingly important number of American hospitals are abandoning their
traditional character as not-for-profit, charitable institutions in order to become
for-profit corporations. In such an economic climate, it cannot be reasonably
assumed that the incentive of potential cost savings of $29 billion to $109 billion
coupled with a newly established "right" to physician..assisted suicide will not invite
varying levels of exploitation of the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped in the
name of patient autonomy and death with dignity.
What is also striking about the reasoning of the courts in Compassion in Dying v.
State and Quilly v. Vacco is their reliance upon the abortion jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court in its most recent articulation in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In his
now classic treatise on American law, Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed that a
judicial principle will tend "to expand itself to the limit of its logic."32 The purported
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expansion of the abortion "liberty" to mandate a "liberty" interest in physicianassisted suicide is a tragic example of Cardow's maxim. Yet it was predicted with
surprising accuracy more than twenty-five years ago by the editors of California
Medicine, the journal of the California Medical Association, when they wrote,
"The traditional Western ethic has always placed great emphasis on the intrinsic
worth and equal value of every human life regardless of its stage or condition ...
The reverence for each and every human life has also been a keystone of Western
medicine and is the ethic which has caused physicians to try to preserve, protect,
repair, prolong, and enhance every human life which comes under their
surveillance. This traditional ethic is still clearly dominant, but . . . it is being
eroded at its core and may eventually even be abandoned ... The process of
eroding the old ethic and substituting the new has already begun. It may be seen
most clearly in changing attitudes toward human abortion ... The part which
medicine will playas all this develops is not yet entirely clear. That it will be
deeply involved is certain. Medicine's role with respect to changing attitudes
toward abortion may well be a prototype of what is to occur . . . One may
anticipate further development of these roles as the problems of birth control and
birth selection are extended inevitably to death selection and death control
whether by the individual or by society ... "33 To say that this "new" ethic has a
logic within it which makes certain developments inevitable is not to say that the
ethic itself is inevitable.
In Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v. Vaceo, two federal circuit courts
have sought to enshrine this "new" ethic in the United States Constitution so as to
control decisions concerning the end of life. It is easy for some at times to view the
"old" ethic as one primarily derived from Christian or, more specifically,
Catholic sources and the "new" ethic as derived from "neutral" and "secular"
sources. Indeed, a significant portion of the circuit court's language in
Compassion in Dying would suggest just such a view. Yet the emergence of
Hippocrates and his Oath in the Western tradition of medicine derives entirely
from non-Christian sources. The Ninth Circuit Court's attempt to banish the
Hippocratic Oath from such life and death decisions by claiming that it
"originated in a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion and that
it certainly was not accepted by aU ancient physicians" (p. 31) misconstrues both the
direction and dynamic of history. Regardless of how many ancient physicians
immediately agreed with Hippocrates, the Hippocratic Oath became the measure of
Western medicine for the same reason that democracy and the classical ideal in
sculpture arose in fifth century Athens - it was the only response which conformed
to the dignity of the human person as a free and moral SUbject. Margaret Mead
summarized this dynamic as follows: "Throughout the primitive world the doctor
and the sorcerer tended to be the same person. He with the power to kill had the
power to cure, including specially the undoing of his own killing activities. He who
had the power to cure would necessarily also be able to kill. With the Greeks [the
Hippocratic Oath] the distinction was made clear. One profession, the followers of
Asclepias, were to be dedicated completely to life under all circumstances,
regardless of rank, age, or intellect - the life of a slave, the life of the Emperor, the
life of a foreign man, the life of a defective child ... [T]his is a priceless always
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possession which we cannot afford to tarnish, but society always is attempting to
make the physician a killer."34 Many in the ancient world embraced the teaching of
Hippocrates because of his affirmation of the moral equality and dignity of his
patients as human persons. It is for those very reasons that many today are willing to
wait for him still.
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